If you need a job, consider working as a writer with The Dallas Morning News.  No experience necessary, and you’ll be writing front-page, headline stories tomorrow.

Here’s what you do:  You don’t actually write an article.  Just give your new editor an idea for a story — a few notes you’ve scribbled down on the back of a napkin.  Tell him he can’t read or edit the story before it goes to print.  He’s got to print it as-is, sight unseen.  None of that time-consuming, arduous fact-checking and proof-reading.  Let me know how that works out.

Of course, The Dallas Morning News would never print an article they haven’t read, but that’s essentially what they want the Dallas City Council to do with ethics reform.

In late August, in response to the recent federal corruption trial, I and four of my colleagues requested that the city attorney brief the council on lobbyist registration processes used by the state legislature and other major cities in Texas.  We wanted to develop a lobbyist registration process that would strengthen ethics at city hall and create greater transparency.

We eventually received that briefing two weeks ago.  The mayor also tacked on his proposal for a lobbyist registration process, as well as his proposed changes to our zoning process and campaign finance reforms.  He wanted us to vote on his proposals a week later (last Wednesday).

Keep in mind, the final ordinances hadn’t yet been written, and, in lieu of any legal documents to examine, we were expected to vote on a list of bullet points and call it good legislation.

Those of us who understand that bullet points aren’t law and that only ordinances have any legal consequence wanted the opportunity to review the final ordinances before voting on them.  We wanted time to put some teeth into the mayor’s proposals, and we wanted to hold two public hearings to get input from Dallas residents on this important matter.

Seven of the council’s fifteen members (myself included) proposed moving the ethics reform vote to mid-December and holding two briefings and public hearings in between.  That would let us review the ordinances and thoughtfully debate amendments, yet still provide a swift response for needed ethics reform.  For this “interminable delay” of six weeks, The Dallas Morning News Editorial Board derided us as “scrambling in a determined effort to derail the Dallas mayor’s plan to vote on ethics reforms.”

To which I say:  What ethics reform? You mean the mayor’s toothless proposals?  Anyone who has actually taken the time to read the cornerstone of the mayor’s reforms — lobbyist registration — knows it won’t do a single thing to prevent corruption.  It’ll kill a lot of trees, waste a lot of city staff time, and result in a lot of paper work for lobbyists, but it won’t actually do anything to prevent corruption.  It will merely require paid lobbyists to list which city officials they’ve had contact with in the last three months.  Big deal.  A smart lobbyist would shoot a two-line email to every single councilmember then list everyone on his quarterly report to camouflage the real target of his lobbying efforts.

How exactly does that prevent corruption?

Window dressing is not enough.  It’s not enough to rush feeble, ineffectual laws that do nothing, then pat ourselves on the back for supposedly cleaning up city hall.  We have an opportunity to bring real transparency to what happens behind closed doors at 1500 Marilla.  We have the chance to illuminate the relationships between lobbyists and councilmembers and reduce the likelihood of corruption.  Without substantive changes, the mayor’s proposals fail on all counts.

In the end, we were unable to move the vote to December, but we were able to move it two weeks so that we can at least read what we are voting on.  (To which the DMNEB sniffed, “Unfortunately, the council didn’t manage to take final action on the proposals.”)

I proposed several amendments last Wednesday. Some were successful, some were not, but all were intended to strengthen the ethics reforms proposed by the mayor. There’s no reason to create a complex process if it doesn’t actually have a chance of preventing corruption.

Here’s a run-down of the changes the council made to the mayor’s proposals on Wednesday (approved by straw vote):

LOBBYIST REGISTRATION

Amendment 1  (Proposed by HUNT):

Require activity reports (but no registration or registration fee) to be filed by any applicant, property owner, or purchaser with a property under contract who lobbies a city council member on any of the following municipal questions relating to public subsidies after the question has been posted on a council agenda or a council committee agenda:

A.   A tax abatement.
B.   A housing tax credit.
C.   An historic development tax abatement.
D.   Federal grant money administered by the city.
E.   Tax increment financing.
F.   An economic development grant or loan.
*Exception for neighborhood associations, crime watch groups, and homeowner’s associations.

The original proposal required only paid lobbyists to report their behind-the-scenes contacts with city officials. I proposed expanding the registration process to include others who lobby city officials for major city subsidies or grants:  applicants as well as real property owners and purchasers. These financial stakeholders stand to gain or lose a great deal as a result of a city council decision.  Thus, they are most vulnerable to corruption, whether as an instigator or victim, and their contacts with city officials require the most scrutiny.

Without this addition, the ordinance was unlikely to have any real chance at preventing corruption because it was focused exclusively on paid lobbyists.  I would not have supported the lobbyist registration proposal had this amendment not been included.

Amendment 2 (Proposed by KOOP, MARGOLIN):

Require simplified activity reports (but no registration or registration fee) to be filed by any applicant, property owner, or purchaser with a property under contract who lobbies a city council member or a member of the city plan commission after an application for the zoning case has been filed with the city on any of the following “designated zoning cases” where:

A.   The property is:
1) 10 acres or more in size for a multifamily use; or
2) 25 acres or more in size for all other uses; or
B.   The zoning application proposes:
1) 200,000 square feet or more of floor area for a retail or commercial use; or
2) 1,000,000 square feet or more of floor area for an industrial use; or
3) a density of 60 units or more per acre for a multifamily use regardless of parcel size; or
C. The city staff recommendation and city plan commission recommendation on the zoning application do not agree.
*Exception for neighborhood associations, crime watch groups, and homeowner’s associations.

Councilmembers Margolin and Koop came up with the idea of limiting the lobbying registration process to “significant” zoning cases. This was a great idea — it focuses our registration process on the big cases, not every small case that comes along. The council further refined the definition for “significant zoning cases” at Wednesday’s meeting with help from planning department staff.

My contribution to this amendment was to include property owners and purchasers (the original proposal included only the zoning applicant).  Zoning cases usually have a lot of players, all with something at stake.  By expanding the definition, we capture other parties who might lobby the council.

Amendment 3 (Proposed by HUNT):

Expand information contained in activity reports to include the type of contact (e-mail, letter, telephone conversation, or in person) a registrant has with a city official.

I tried to get even more information disclosed, like the date of meetings with councilmembers, their location, and attendees. That, to me, would really shed light on the lobbying process. But I couldn’t get enough support for that, so I settled for requiring disclosure of the type of contacts made to each city official. I also tried (unsuccessfully) to get monthly, rather than quarterly, reporting, to ensure timely public disclosure before a council decision.

Amendment 4 (Proposed by HUNT):

Eliminate the exception to lobbying registration for a regularly-employed individual who is paid regardless of lobbying activities and whose lobbying activities are not more than five percent of his or her regular responsibilities in any calendar year. (The exception is contained in the definitions of “compensation” and “expenditure” in the proposed ordinance.).

The original proposal excluded from the registration process those who spent less than 5% of their time lobbying. But this seemed like a loophole, and that was confirmed in talking with officials from other cities who have that threshold. Who monitors and audits the rule? Nobody. So we took it out. If you’re paid to lobby you’re a paid lobbyist.

Amendment 5 (Proposed by HUNT):

Establish a flat annual registration fee of $300, with unlimited clients.

The proposed ordinance had a $20 fee for every new client, but that would just mean more paperwork for the limited staff at the city secretary’s office. I proposed a flat fee to simplify things.

Amendment 6 (Proposed by HUNT):

Require lobbyist registration, registration fee, and activity reports by any person receiving $200 or more in outside compensation or reimbursement for lobbying purposes in a calendar quarter (with no expenditure amount triggering registration as in the proposed ordinance).

The original proposal defined a paid lobbyist as someone who was either paid OR who spent money on lobbying efforts. Why track the people who spend money but aren’t paid?

Amendment 7 (Proposed by HUNT, LEPPERT):

Only require expenditures with a cumulative value over $5,000 in a calendar quarter to be disclosed and categorized in activity reports.

The proposed ordinance had required lobbyists to disclose expenditures for a lot of things that seemed irrelevant to me: advertising and publications; compensation to other than full-time employees; reimbursement to others; personal sustenance, lodging, and travel; and other expenses. I didn’t understand why we would care what a lobbyist spent on advertising or personal sustenance. But the mayor made a good point — significant expenditures in these areas indicates a real interest in influencing a council vote (increasing the likelihood of corruption). I agreed, and proposed that we limit reported expenditures to those above $5000 so we would capture only the larger cases.

Amendment 8 (Proposed by KOOP, MARGOLIN):

Add a provision prohibiting any person bidding on a city contract from lobbying a city council member from the time the advertisement or public notification of the request for bids is made until the time the contract is awarded by the city council. This would not prohibit a bidder from speaking at the city council meeting where the award of the contract is considered.

Councilmembers Koop and Margolin proposed this, and I agreed whole-heartedly.

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS

Amendment 1 (Proposed by HUNT):

Add a provision prohibiting any person requesting any of the following public subsidies from the city from making a campaign contribution to a city council member from the time the item is posted on a council committee agenda or a council agenda until 60 days after the date the city council votes on the matter:

• A tax abatement
• A housing tax credit
• An historic development tax abatement
• Federal grant money administered by the city
• Tax increment financing
• An economic development grant or loan.

The original proposal applied only to zoning applicants.  Zoning cases are only a small part of the consequential matters we hear.  I proposed expanding the prohibition to include others appealing to the city council on significant decisions.

Amendment 2 (Proposed by HUNT, KOOP, MARGOLIN):

Add a provision prohibiting any person responding to a request for bids or request for proposals on a city contract from making a campaign contribution to a city council member from the time the advertisement or public notification of the request for bids or request for proposals is made until 60 days after the date the contract is awarded by the city council.

This was proposed by Councilmembers Koop, Margolin, and me. People requesting city contracts don’t need to be giving us campaign contributions. It smells bad. (I had also tried to prohibit gifts as well as any business dealings with councilmembers, but I didn’t have enough support.)

Amendment 3 (Proposed by KOOP, MARGOLIN):

Apply campaign contribution restrictions to “designated zoning cases” as defined above.

The original proposal prohibited campaign contributions for any zoning case. Councilmembers Koop and Margolin proposed to limit this restriction to significant zoning cases (which are most vulnerable to corruption). I think it was a smart way to prevent undue influence of councilmembers, or even the appearance of impropriety, while eliminating unnecessary bureaucracy with smaller zoning cases (where the likelihood of corruption is very small).

ZONING PROCESS CHANGES (Proposed by KOOP, MARGOLIN)

The following matters require two seconds by councilmembers, which indicates a thorough understanding of the matter:

• A “designated zoning case” as defined above
• A tax abatement
• A housing tax credit
• An historic development tax abatement.
• Federal grant money administered by the city
• Tax increment financing
• An economic development grant or loan.

The original proposal would have required three seconds to move forward any motion on a zoning case.  Councilmembers Koop and Margolin proposed that multiple seconds be limited to significant zoning cases, and that only two seconds be required.

In my opinion, councilmembers are already responsible for thoroughly understanding the matters on which we vote, so I was indifferent to this new rule requiring two seconds. I supported the change.

Only two other councilmembers — Hill and Margolin — supported my proposal to prohibit campaign consultants for the mayor or councilmembers from also serving as lobbyists on issues that will be decided by the city council or a board appointed by the city council. Campaign consultants for powerful members of the council exert too much influence over other councilmembers when that consultant is also working as a paid lobbyists on matters pending before the council.

We’re scheduled to vote on this November 9.

Today I sent the following suggestions to my council colleagues on how we can put some real teeth in the Mayor’s proposal to regulate lobbyists and limit campaign contributions:

The purpose of creating a lobbyist registration system is to reduce the likelihood of corruption at City Hall.  But for this system to be effective, we must focus on the nature of the problem, then develop a system that will, to the fullest extent possible, create a climate hostile to such corruption. 

What corrupt activity are we trying to prevent?

Buying influence from the mayor and councilmembers.  Trading money for a favorable vote. 

Who would have incentive to bribe an elected official?  Who would a corrupt elected official think they could extract a bribe from? 

Someone who’s got a financial stake in a decision by the council.

Are paid lobbyists the problem? 

No.  But like smoke denotes fire, paid lobbyists indicate there’s somebody who has such a significant financial stake in a council decision that they would expend money on a professional to fight on their behalf.

How do we keep a “financial stakeholder” from paying off the mayor or a councilmember? 

We can’t.  People who are corrupt will find a way around any rule we create.  But we can shed so much light on the relationship between a financial stakeholder and city officials that we make it very difficult for them to trade money for influence.

So how do we shed light on the relationship between financial stakeholders and city officials? 

By requiring them to disclose the same information we are requiring paid lobbyists to provide.  And by requiring both lobbyists and financial stakeholders to disclose information that illuminates and gives context to the extent of their relationships with city officials.

The following changes to the proposed ordinance attempt to accomplish just that. 

 Proposed Changes to Lobbyist Registration Ordinance

Require “Financial Stakeholders” who lobby city officials to register and disclose their meetings with city officials.

A “Financial Stakeholder” is a person or business that stands to receive a direct, material benefit resulting from a vote by the City Council.  This includes, but is not limited to, applicants, real property owners, and real property purchasers, as well as their employees, agents and assigns, who are seeking from the city:

• Tax abatements;
• Housing tax credits;
• Historic tax credits;
• Federal grants administered by the city;
• Tax increment financing projects;
• Re-zoning requests;
• Anyone who hires or employs a lobbyist to meet with city officials on their behalf in regard to an issue pending before the city council

Prohibit gifts from lobbyists and financial stakeholders.

Prohibit a lobbyist or financial stakeholder from giving money or goods to any business that a city official has an economic interest in.

Require monthly (rather than quarterly) filing of disclosure forms.

• The real check and balance in this entire system is the public.  This system gives the public and the media some measure of access to what is going on behind closed doors at city hall.  But this information is most meaningful before a matter is voted on by the council.  That is when questions of influence are most pertinent and (perhaps) damning:  Councilmember X met a lobbyist at a country club twice a week for a month?  Councilmember Y’s meetings with a lobbyist included a major campaign contributor/powerful Dallasite?
• Monthly reports will give the public access to important information when it is most relevant.  If reports are filed only every three months, the public won’t have the opportunity to bring to light arguably compromising information before a matter is voted on by the city council.  Quarterly disclosures may make the disclosed information moot and blunt the goal of this disclosure system.

Include more information about each meeting a lobbyist or financial stakeholder has with city officials: 

• Name of city official(s)
• Date of meeting
• Length of meeting
• Location of meeting
• Attendees, identifying lobbyist staff, financial stakeholders, and other attendees

This information is critical to addressing the purpose of this disclosure system:  to illuminate the extent of relationships between lobbyists and city officials.  Simply listing the city officials that a lobbyist met with (the proposed standard) does not distinguish between those city officials who met with a lobbyists two hours every week from those who simply received a single, two minute phone call.  By providing the public with access to information outlining the depth of a relationship between a lobbyist and city official, we reduce the likelihood of corruption.

Prohibit campaign consultants for the mayor or councilmembers from also serving as lobbyists on issues that will be decided by the city council or a board appointed by the city council.

Campaign consultants for powerful members of the council may exert too much influence over other councilmembers when that consultant is also working as a paid lobbyists on matters pending before the council.

Flat annual fee for registrants (not graduated based on number of clients).

If a paid lobbyist and her client both lobby city officials, only the paid lobbyist has to register (assuming the filing form will include information that would name the client).  If the financial stakeholder does not hire a lobbyist, but nonetheless lobbies city officials on his own, he must register and file disclosures as a lobbyist.

Require registrants to disclose only the following in relation to lobbying on a pending matter:

• Compensation to other than full-time employees
• Reimbursement to other than full-time employees

This information can reveal if community leaders (or others) are being paid to drum up support for a particular matter or if their support is genuine.

The other proposed disclosures – amounts expended on office expenses, advertising, personal sustenance, lodging, and travel – are unnecessary.  Why do we need this information and how will it help prevent corruption?  Lobbyists are not the problem; the problem is corrupt city officials.  So unless the required information helps us root out or prevent corruption, we shouldn’t burden lobbyists with disclosing irrelevant, insignificant private business information.

Eliminate requirement for lobbyists to disclose emails or other written communications to city officials.

How does requiring a lobbyist to list whom they’ve sent emails illuminate the relationship between lobbyists and city officials?  It doesn’t give a sense of which city officials they’ve had protracted and frequent email correspondence with – it’s just a list of email recipients.  A smart lobbyist will simply send a short email to the entire council so they can claim each on their disclosure form, thus camouflaging those with whom they’ve been in regular email contact.

This requirement sheds no real light on the relationship between a lobbyist and city official and is ineffectual.  Moreover, since emails to city officials are subject to open records requests, this requirement is superfluous.

Eliminate from definition of “lobbyist” someone who “expends $200 or more in a calendar quarter” on lobbying efforts

Why is it significant to track lobbyists who expend funds, but who are not paid for their efforts?  A neighborhood attorney might volunteer his or her time to assist a neighborhood in fighting a nearby development, and might personally pay for $200 worth of photocopies.  In all likelihood, neither the neighborhood nor the volunteer attorney has such a significant financial stake that in the outcome of the city council’s decision that they would try to bribe a city official.  So there is no need to require them to participate in this disclosure process.

We should be focused on requiring disclosures from lobbyists who receive compensation from their clients.  Such payment indicates that the clients have such a significant, real financial stake in the outcome of a city council decision that they would hire someone to try to persuade city officials.  Those are the people who would have an incentive to bribe city officials, or who would be vulnerable to being extorted by corrupt city officials. 

Eliminate prohibition on lobbyists accepting contingency fee cases

How does prohibiting contingency fee cases reduce the likelihood that a lobbyist would try to bribe a city official?  Why do we want to regulate how a private business can be paid by its clients, when the real problem isn’t paid lobbyists but corrupt city officials?

Proposed Changes to Contribution Restrictions 

Zoning cases aren’t the only matters where significant financial interests are at stake.  Tax abatements, TIF project requests, housing tax credits, contracts with the City of Dallas — all of these matters have very serious monetary consequences for the applicant.  So why not expand the proposed contribution limitations to include these matters as well?

Proposed Changes:
Expand matters to include pending:

• Tax abatements;
• Housing tax credits;
• Historic tax credits;
• Federal grants administered by the city;
• Tax increment financing projects;
• Re-zoning requests

Contributions are prohibited 60 days prior to application for any of these matters and six months after the matter has been decided by the council or withdrawn.

I think this is a necessary and important reform.  But, again, we need to go further if we want to reduce the appearance of impropriety or the risk of corruption.

Zoning cases aren’t the only matters where significant financial interests are at stake.  Tax abatements, TIF project requests, housing tax credits, contracts with the City of Dallas — all of these matters have very serious monetary consequences for the applicant.  So why not expand the proposed contribution limitations to include these matters as well?

As for the timeframe on the restriction:  sixty days is too short, especially when zoning cases often begin up to a year before zoning notices are sent out (the trigger for the 60 days).  So a zoning application may be on file, that applicant may contribute to a councilmember’s campaign, and then several months later the council actually hears the case.  The 60-day time period wasn’t violated, but there may still be an appearance of impropriety.  Instead, we should restrict contributions to a year before the application is made to the city and a year after a decision is made.  Similar triggers would need to be determined for the other matters decided by the council (TIF requests, tax credits, etc.).  I would not object to placing the same restrictions on non-incumbent council candidates, not just officeholders, to ensure a level playing field.

This would most likely have a chilling effect on contributions to councilmembers — who can predict when they will bring a zoning case before the city, bid on a city contract, or request TIF funds? – but I don’t think that’s necessarily a bad thing.  We don’t need the appearance of a “pay to play” system in Dallas, and broadening the scope of the issues covered by this reform, as well as expanding the time limitation, will go a long way in reducing the appearance of impropriety and helping the City of Dallas regain the public trust.

Right now, people who are paid to persuade city officials to vote a certain way on an issue are not required to register with the city or, more importantly, to disclose which officials they’re lobbying. We need to shed as much light on this process as possible and bring as much transparency to these interactions so we can reduce the likelihood of corruption and the appearance of impropriety.

The city attorney looked at other major Texas cities and the State of Texas for their lobbying registration process. For the most part, it’s a good proposal. But in several ways, it doesn’t go far enough.

The most important part of lobbyist registration is revealing which city official — councilmember, city board member, city staff member — the lobbyist met with on a particular issue, who was present, where they met, when they met, and for how long.  This needs to be disclosed within 48 hours of the meeting, to ensure that as the matter is considered by the council or city board, the public knows what’s happening behind closed doors before the issue is heard before the council or city board.

Under the current proposal, the lobbyist only has to provide a list of city officials he or she met with, and submit that to the City Secretary on a quarterly basis.  There’s no explanation of when or how often the lobbyist met with the councilmember (once or twenty times? for five minutes or two hours?), who was present at the meeting (a lobbyist staffer or an influential Dallasite?), where they met (city hall or The Mansion?), how often they met (once or twenty times?), or how long the meeting was (five minutes or two hours?). These are the types of disclosures that will make city hall more transparent and help reduce the likelihood of corruption.

There’s also a provision in the current proposal that limits lobbyists from giving city officials gifts with a cumulative value of more than $25. Why not simply prohibit gifts altogether? And why not restrict gifts not just from lobbyists but also their clients? If someone has an issue before the city, they don’t need to be giving gifts to councilmembers, city board members, or city staff.

Lastly, we need to prohibit people who work for the mayor or city council on campaign matters from also serving as lobbyists on issues that will be decided by the city council or a board appointed by the city council. There is too much opportunity for that campaign consultant to implicitly wield too much influence by virtue of their relationship with the mayor or councilmember. Jim Schutze explained it best in his article “Lesson learned from federal corruption trial: How to gain access to the portals of power at City Hall.”

We can create strong ethics rules that will reduce the likelihood of corruption and the appearance of impropriety at City Hall, but we’re going to have to go further than what was proposed today if it’s going to be more than window dressing.